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Abstract
Are positive illusions about the self adaptive? Controversy surrounding this question can
be traced to two features of past research. First, diﬀerent researchers have used diﬀerent cri-
teria to assess bias in self-evaluation. Some have relied on normative models, whereas others
have relied on social consensus. We identify problems associated with each of these subjective
methods and suggest the use of objective or operational criteria. Second, bias in self-evaluation
can result from diﬀerent motivations. In some cases, overly positive self-reports may reﬂect
self-protective or avoidance motivations, whereas in other cases they may reﬂect self-enhance-
ment or approach motivations. We argue that it is not the level of self-evaluation bias, per se,
that determines whether such bias is associated with positive or negative consequences. In-
stead, consequences are related to the speciﬁc motivation underlying this bias. Two studies ex-
amine these issues in the context of self-evaluation and academic performance in college.
 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Considerable controversy exists in the psychological literature about the costs and
beneﬁts of exaggerating, or enhancing, the self. Clinical psychologists traditionally
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Rogers, 1951). Taylor and Brown (1988, 1994) proposed instead that positive illu-
sions are a hallmark of adaptive psychological functioning—that self-enhancing de-
viations from reality are normative and generally beneﬁcial. Other theorists
challenged the Taylor and Brown perspective, claiming that their arguments suﬀer
theoretical and empirical shortcomings (Colvin & Block, 1994).
2. The self-enhancement controversy
Much of the controversy can be traced to diﬀerences in the criteria, or baselines,
that researchers use to assess bias in self-evaluation (Robins & John, 1997). These
criteria, in turn, inﬂuence conclusions about why persons report overly positive
self-views, and whether these positive illusions are beneﬁcial.
2.1. Normative models
Normative models represent one approach to assessing bias in self-evaluation
(Robins & John, 1997). A common procedure is to ask participants to compare
the self to an average or generalized other. The majority of persons rate themselves
as superior to others, and they do so across a wide array of positive attributes (e.g.,
Alicke, 1985; Campbell, 1986). Positive discrepancies of this type correlate positively
with self-esteem (Brown, 1986) and positive aﬀect (Gibbons, 1986). Findings based
on this approach, therefore, are consistent with Taylor and Browns (1988) assertion
that positive illusions about the self are normal and adaptive.
Colvin and Block (1994), however, argued that judgments about abstract others
(e.g., ‘‘the average person’’) are not an appropriate baseline for assessing bias in
self-evaluation. The problem with this approach, according to Colvin and Block,
is that it does not distinguish persons who are accurate in describing themselves from
persons who are inaccurate. That is, some who claim to be superior on a given di-
mension (e.g., athleticism) will be exaggerating their true standing, whereas others
will be identifying a veriﬁable aspect of themselves.
We refer to this as the accuracy/exaggeration problem. Importantly, this problem
makes it diﬃcult to interpret any observed relation between patterns of self-evalua-
tion and other constructs, such as psychological well-being. Using normative models,
it is not possible to conclude that positive illusions about the self are adaptive, be-
cause some persons labeled as ‘‘self-enhancers’’ may enjoy psychological beneﬁts as-
sociated with legitimately favorable social comparisons. The critics of this method,
therefore, argue that external criteria are needed to gauge the veracity of a persons
self-description.
2.2. Social consensus
To establish an external criterion, researchers sometimes rely on social consensus
(Robins & John, 1997). For example, Colvin, Block, and Funder (1995) used a set of
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ratings. Psychologists and graduate students who interacted with each teenager
‘‘across many sessions over several days’’ served as observers. An index of self-eval-
uation bias was derived by comparing the favorability of self-ratings with the favor-
ability of observer-ratings. Those participants who evaluated themselves more
favorably than they were evaluated by the observers were labeled ‘‘self-enhancers.’’
A second, independent set of observer-ratings (obtained ﬁve years after the ﬁrst as-
sessment) was used to determine whether self-enhancers beneﬁted psychologically
from their positive self-views. To the contrary, self-enhancement bias at the ﬁrst as-
sessment was associated with negative observer-ratings ﬁve years later. Colvin et al.
(1995) also compared self-ratings to ratings made by peers (primarily friends and
roommates). Participants who rated themselves more favorably than they were rated
by their peers were evaluated negatively by strangers following a brief discussion and
debate. Based on third-party ratings, then, overly positive self-evaluations appear to
be related to negative interpersonal characteristics (see also, John & Robins, 1994).
This conclusion is supported and qualiﬁed by Paulhus (1998, Study 2), who com-
pared university students self-ratings with ratings made by close acquaintances. He
classiﬁed students who evaluated themselves more favorably than they were evalu-
ated by their acquaintances as self-enhancers. All students later began a series of
weekly discussion groups (students in each group were unfamiliar with one another
prior to these discussions). After each discussion, group members evaluated each
other on several personality attributes. Following the ﬁrst discussion, students clas-
siﬁed previously as self-enhancers received favorable evaluations from their fellow
group members. By the seventh week, however, self-enhancement was associated
with unfavorable evaluations. Thus, overly positive self-evaluations were beneﬁcial
when making ﬁrst impressions, but these impressions turned sour over time.
Using social consensus as an external criterion may address the accuracy/exagger-
ation problem inherent in the normative approach by identifying persons whose po-
sitive self-evaluations are not corroborated by others. However, this method may
have some drawbacks of its own. For one, there is a hint of cyclical logic to the con-
clusion that self-enhancement is maladaptive. This is because third-party ratings are
used both to measure self-evaluation bias and to assess whether such bias is psycho-
logically beneﬁcial. For example, in Colvin et al.s (1995) Study 1, observer-ratings
were used as the criterion for establishing self-evaluation bias at Time 1. At Time
2, observer-ratings were used as the index for psychological well-being. Thus, the as-
sociation between self-enhancement and poor psychological well-being may reﬂect
the fact that observers formed similar judgments of each participant. Persons who
were evaluated unfavorably by both sets of observers likely would have had high
self-enhancement scores and negative psychological well-being scores, whereas per-
sons evaluated favorably by both sets of observers likely would have had low self-en-
hancement scores and positive well-being scores. The association may have little to
do with self-evaluation, per se.
Second, the negative consequences associated with this form of self-evaluation
bias have been restricted primarily to interpersonal outcomes and ratings. It is
possible that overly positive self-evaluations are maladaptive for interpersonal
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and subjective well-being. Indeed, Paulhus (1998) argued that self-enhancement is
a ‘‘mixed blessing’’—being associated positively with self-reported ego-resilience
and self-esteem, despite its association with negative evaluations from other persons.
Third, there is no reason to assume that social consensus is necessarily more accurate
than self-ratings. Each person has access to unique information about the self that is
not available to outside observers. Clearly, social consensus represents a reality; but
it is not the only reality.
Finally, in both approaches, researchers have used attributes that are global and
ambiguously deﬁned (e.g., ‘‘intelligent,’’ ‘‘well-adjusted,’’ and ‘‘agreeable’’). These
attributes may be problematic for establishing self-evaluation bias because partici-
pants often use idiosyncratic criteria when making self-ratings on global traits (Dun-
ning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989). For instance, one person may claim to be
‘‘talented’’ because of musical abilities, while another may claim to be ‘‘talented’’ be-
cause of academic abilities. In eﬀect, diﬀerent persons can apply diﬀerent deﬁnitions
to the same global trait. In addition, diﬀerent deﬁnitions may shift whether a global
trait is perceived to be positive or negative. For example, traits such as ‘‘competi-
tive,’’ ‘‘dominant,’’ and ‘‘proud’’ could be viewed in either a positive or negative
light, depending on the context. This asymmetry implies that trait-ratings of the self
and others may not be directly comparable (Hayes & Dunning, 1997). As a result,
measures of self-evaluation bias that are based either on normative models or on so-
cial consensus may be contaminated by individual diﬀerences in judgment criteria.
We refer to this as the asymmetric-deﬁnition problem.
2.3. Operational criteria
A third approach to assessing bias in self-evaluation is to concentrate on attri-
butes that are speciﬁc, objective, and veriﬁable. Robins and John (1997) refer to
these as operational criteria. Within important domains of self-evaluation (e.g., aca-
demic/intellectual performance for college students), it is possible to identify opera-
tional criteria (e.g., test scores, grade point averages, or class rank) that persons may
misreport due to self-evaluative concerns. Using operational criteria to assess biased
self-views avoids the accuracy/exaggeration problem by distinguishing persons
whose favorable self-reports are accurate from those whose self-reports are exagger-
ated. In addition, it avoids the asymmetric-deﬁnition problem by providing a con-
crete deﬁnition of the attribute. Despite these beneﬁts, research involving speciﬁc,
objective, and veriﬁable aspects of the self is lacking.
2.4. Diﬀerence scores versus residuals
Finally, researchers have used two basic strategies for calculating self-evaluation
bias. One strategy is to calculate a diﬀerence score by subtracting the criterion from
the self-report. Concerns about the use of diﬀerence scores, however, have prompted
an alternative strategy, in which self-reports are regressed on the external criterion,
and the residual is used as the index of self-evaluation bias. Paulhus and John (1998)
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because it removes any variance that is due to individual diﬀerences on the criterion
(see also Robins & John, 1997). One consequence of the SCR procedure is that it
eliminates the possibility of a negative association between the criterion and the bias
index. The concern is that this negative association (if observed) is a statistical arti-
fact that confounds interpretation of the bias variable. In contrast, Colvin, Block,
and Funder (1996) argue that the association between the criterion and the level
of bias in self-report represents a conceptually important self-evaluative process.
We believe that insights can be gained from both strategies. Thus, we incorporate
both the diﬀerence score and residual strategies in our analyses, and attempt to high-
light the conceptual and statistical diﬀerences between these two approaches.
3. Exaggerating one’s academic performance
The controversy over self-evaluation bias can be framed in three questions. First,
what criteria should researchers use to establish reality? Second, why would persons
exaggerate their self-reports relative to these criteria? Third, what costs and beneﬁts
are associated with the tendency to exaggerate self-reports? In the present article, we
address each of these questions as they relate to students self-reports of academic
performance.
3.1. GPA: The criterion
First, how should reality be deﬁned? In this article, we used grade point average
(GPA) as an operational criterion. We chose GPA because it is speciﬁc, objective,
and veriﬁable. In addition, it is a value known by students (they receive this informa-
tion at the end of each semester); it reﬂects an important attribute (competence); it
has instrumental signiﬁcance (being linked to occupational and educational pros-
pects upon graduation); and it is malleable and controllable (a students behavior
can impact his or her GPA). In short, reporting GPA is likely to be an ego-involved
task for many students.
3.2. Motivational antecedents of GPA exaggeration
Second, why might students exaggerate their GPAs? We believe that exaggerated
self-reports in this context can reﬂect concerns either with self-protection or with
self-enhancement (Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989). Self-protection represents a
motivation to avoid negative inferences about the self, whereas self-enhancement
represents a motivation to create positive inferences about the self. The distinction
between protection and enhancement has been identiﬁed as an important diﬀerence
in self-presentational style. For example, high self-esteem persons self-handicap fol-
lowing success in order to enhance the self, whereas low self-esteem persons self-
handicap following failure in order to protect the self (Rhodewalt, Morf, Hazlett,
& Fairchild, 1991; Tice, 1991). Similar distinctions have been made in the motiva-
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Church (1997) distinguished between approach goals that focus on acquiring or
maintaining a positive outcome or state, and avoidance goals that focus on moving
or staying away from a negative outcome or state. Likewise, Higgins (1999) distin-
guished between promotion-focused forms of self-regulation that are associated with
a sensitivity to potential positive outcomes, and prevention-focused forms of self-
regulation that are associated with a sensitivity to potential negative outcomes.
Based on the distinction between self-protection/avoidance and self-enhancement/
approach, we identiﬁed two distinct motivational antecedents for GPA exaggeration.
First, we predict that low actual GPA will be associated with exaggerated self-reports
of GPA. Acknowledging low grades (even to the self) could produce negative aﬀect,
because low grades suggest a lack of academic ability or eﬀort. By denying poor per-
formance, negative aﬀect may be managed or partially avoided. This motivation for
exaggeration is self-protective in that it is prompted by a desire to avoid negative im-
plications that would result from acknowledging poor performance.
Second, we believe that individual diﬀerences in the motivational signiﬁcance of
GPA will be an additional factor contributing to exaggerated self-reports. Paulhus
and John (1998) distinguished between two primary dimensions of self-evaluation
bias: egoistic bias, which is reﬂected in self-reports of status and competence, and
moralistic bias, which is reﬂected in self-reports of conscientiousness and other so-
cially approved behaviors. Paulhus and John linked egoistic bias to the human va-
lue of agency, which emphasizes ‘‘individuality, personal striving, growth, and
achievement,’’ and they link moralistic bias to the value of communion, which em-
phasizes ‘‘relationships, intimacy, and beneﬁting others’’ (p. 1039). We believe that
self-reports of GPA will be inﬂuenced primarily by egoistic concerns related to
competence. In addition, we believe that the value of agency is best represented
in the academic context by needfor achievement (Atkinson & Feather, 1966; Mur-
ray, 1938). This motive represents a dispositional desire to meet high standards
and attain excellence (McClelland, 1985). Given that self-report bias often accom-
panies a motive to excel in a given domain (Paulhus & John, 1998), we predict
that persons high in needfor achievement will exaggerate their self-reports of
GPA. This motivation for exaggeration is self-enhancing in that it is prompted
by a desire to experience the positive implications that would result from success-
ful performance.
3.3. Distinguishing between motivational factors
We have argued that actual level of performance and need for achievement will
each predict exaggerated self-reports of GPA. But, how can we distinguish these
two motivational factors from one another?
Independent and opposite eﬀects. First, we regard the two motivational factors as
conceptually independent predictors of exaggeration. They may be correlated posi-
tively with one another, because persons high in need for achievement may also ob-
tain good grades. As detailed above, however, they are posited to have opposite
relations to exaggeration. We predicted that actual performance would be negatively
46 R.H. Gramzow et al. / Journal of Research in Personality 37 (2003) 41–61related to exaggerated reports of GPA, whereas need for achievement would be pos-
itively related to exaggeration.
Subsequent performance. Second, we believe that these two motivations have dif-
ferent consequences for future academic performance. This distinction addresses the
third question surrounding the self-enhancement controversy: What costs and ben-
eﬁts are experienced by persons who report overly positive self-views? As we de-
scribed earlier, the literature is divided as to whether self-evaluation bias
contributes to favorable psychological outcomes (Colvin & Block, 1994; Paulhus,
1998; Taylor & Brown, 1988). The literature is also divided as to whether such bias
facilitates subsequent performance. In some studies, overly positive self-views appear
to be associated with performance advantages (e.g., Blanton, Buunk, Gibbons, &
Kuyper, 1999). In other studies, persons with overly positive self-views perform no
better than those who provide accurate self-reports (e.g., Robins & Beer, 2001).
There appears, then, to be no clear relation between self-evaluation bias and sub-
sequent performance. We believe that this ambiguity reﬂects the fact that distinct
motivational antecedents may be contributing to exaggerated self-reports. On one
hand, we have argued that some students exaggerate their GPAs to avoid the nega-
tive implications associated with poor actual performance. On the other hand, we
have argued that exaggeration may also reﬂect a need to achieve academically. As
noted previously, an important distinction between these two motivational processes
is the degree to which they represent a protection/avoidance orientation or an en-
hancement/approach orientation. It may be the case, therefore, that exaggeration
will be diﬀerentially associated with performance as a function of the motivational
factor that is contributing to the exaggeration. This notion led to our ﬁnal pair of
predictions. To the degree that exaggerated self-reports reﬂect poor actual perfor-
mance (protection/avoidance), we predict that exaggeration will be coordinated with
poor performance in the future. However, once actual performance is statistically
controlled, and exaggeration reﬂects a strong achievement motivation (enhance-
ment/approach), we predict that exaggeration will be associated with improved fu-
ture performance. We test these possibilities using a series of regression analyses.
4. Study 1
4.1. Overview
The purpose of Study 1 was to test three sets of hypotheses. First, will students
exaggerate their academic performance, relative to an objective and veriﬁable crite-
rion (GPA)? Second, will an enhancement/approach motivation (need for achieve-
ment) and a protection/avoidance motivation (poor prior performance)
independently predict exaggerated self-reports? And, third, will exaggeration
grounded in poor prior performance predict poor subsequent performance, while ex-
aggeration grounded in need for achievement predicts improved performance?
In addition, we examined models that treat exaggeration both as a diﬀerence score
and as a self-criterion residual score (self-reported GPA controlling for actual GPA).
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5.1. Participants andoverview of proced ure
Data for Study 1 came from a larger investigation of academic motivation and
performance (Elliot & McGregor, 1999). A total of 177 university students (75 male
and 102 female) from an undergraduate psychology course participated in exchange
for extra credit. The study was conducted in multiple sessions over the course of a
semester.
5.2. Materials
5.2.1. Grade point average (GPA)
During the ﬁrst week of the semester, participants completed a demographic ques-
tionnaire in which they indicated their cumulative grade point average (GPA)
through the previous semester. The grading scale at this university ranges from 0.0
to 4.0. Participants actual GPAs were obtained from the university registrar (with
student consent, which was obtained after receiving self-reports of GPA).
5.2.2. Needfor achievement
During the ﬁrst two to three weeks of the semester, participants completed a ques-
tionnaire that contained the achievement motivation subscale from the Personality
Research Form (Jackson, 1984). Previous research supports the reliability and con-
struct validity of this measure (Fineman, 1977; Fiske, 1973; Harper, 1975). In addi-
tion, previous work attests to its predictive validity in the college classroom (Elliot &
Church, 1997). The achievement motivation scale is composed of 16 true–false items,
such as ‘‘I often set goals that are diﬃcult to reach’’ and ‘‘I will not be satisﬁed until I
am the best in my ﬁeld of work.’’ The internal consistency of this scale was satisfac-
tory for the present sample (K-R 20¼.71).
5.2.3. Subsequent performance
Participants ﬁnal grades for the course were based on three exams given during
the semester. Course grades were recorded as the proportion of total points earned
by each participant.
6. Results
6.1. Exaggeration in self-reports of GPA
We computed an exaggeration index by subtracting each participants actual GPA
from his or her self-reported GPA (i.e., a diﬀerence score). On average, participants
over-reported their GPAs by just over 1/10th of a point (M ¼ :114, SD ¼ :338). This
was a signiﬁcant discrepancy, tð173Þ¼4:45, p <: 001. The degree of exaggeration
varied widely (min ¼  0:84; max ¼ 2:33). Few students (9.2%) under-reported their
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by this margin. Indeed, 14% over-reported by at least 1/4 point, 6% by at least 1/2
point, and 3% by a full point or more.
6.2. Predicting exaggeration
Having determined that students, on average, did exaggerate their GPAs, we next
examined whether levels of actual performance and achievement motivation pre-
dicted the magnitude of exaggeration. Table 1 contains the bivariate associations
among these variables. First, achievement motivation and actual GPA were corre-
lated positively with one another. However, these two predictors had opposite rela-
tions with the exaggeration diﬀerence score. Actual GPA was associated negatively
with exaggeration, whereas achievement motivation was associated positively with
exaggeration.
A multiple regression analysis predicting exaggeration from both achievement
motivation and actual GPA indicated that each predictor had a signiﬁcant unique
association with exaggeration. Higher achievement motivation was related to higher
exaggeration (b ¼ :29, p <: 001), whereas lower actual GPA was related to higher
exaggeration (b ¼  :56, p <: 001). Note that, by controlling for actual GPA, this
analysis indicates that achievement motivation predicted a residualized index of ex-
aggeration.
1
6.3. Predicting ﬁnal grade
We next examined the relation between the tendency to exaggerate ones GPA and
subsequent academic performance. The correlations in Table 1 indicate that the ex-
aggeration diﬀerence score was correlated negatively with ﬁnal course grade. This
suggests that exaggeration may have detrimental eﬀects on subsequent performance.
The pattern of associations, thus far, is represented in Fig. 1 (Model 1).
Table 1 also indicates that achievement motivation and actual GPA were each
correlated positively with the ﬁnal grade in the course, even though they had oppo-
site relations with exaggeration. Recall our prediction that the relation between ex-
aggerated self-reports and subsequent performance will depend on the motivation
underlying the exaggeration. To address this possibility, we examined the relation
between exaggeration and ﬁnal grade, ﬁrst controlling for the eﬀects of one motiva-
tional variable (achievement motivation), and then controlling for the eﬀects of the
other motivational variable (actual GPA).
In Model 2, using multiple regression, we controlled for the eﬀects of achievement
motivation on ﬁnal grade. As shown in Fig. 1 (Model 2), the relation between the
1 Controlling for actual GPA when predicting the exaggeration diﬀerence score (self-reported GPA–
actual GPA) yields the same residual that would result from controlling for actual GPA when predicting
self-reported GPA alone. In both cases the residual represents self-reported GPA removing the variance
associated with the criterion (actual GPA). This is why controlling for actual GPA eﬀectively transforms
the exaggeration index from a diﬀerence score into a self-criterion residual score.
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geration reﬂected its association with poor actual GPA and, therefore, was coordi-
nated with poor grades in the future.
In Model 3, we controlled for the eﬀects of actual GPA on ﬁnal grade. As noted
previously (see Footnote 1), this transforms the exaggeration index from a diﬀerence
score into a self-criterion residual score. As shown in Fig. 1 (Model 3), the relation
between the exaggeration residual score and ﬁnal grade became positive and signif-
icant. In this model, exaggeration reﬂected its association with achievement motiva-
tion and was coordinated with improved academic performance (relative to initial
level of GPA).
6.4. An alternative index of exaggeration: proportion
Our use of a diﬀerence score as the exaggeration index raises the possibility that the
negative correlation between actual performance and exaggeration is a statistical ar-
tifact. That is, students with lower grades have more room on the 0–4 GPA scale to
exaggerate than do students with higher grades. For example, a student with an actual
GPA of 2.3 could exaggerate by a maximum of 1.7 points, whereas a student with a
GPA of 3.5 could exaggerate by a maximum of only .5 points. In an attempt to ad-
dress the possibility that the association between GPA and exaggeration was spuri-
ous, we calculated the exaggeration index using an alternative procedure. For each
student, we determined the diﬀerence between his or her actual GPA and the maxi-
mum GPA possible (4.0). We then computed the exaggeration index as the propor-
tion of this diﬀerence by which the students self-report deviated from his or her
actual GPA. Thus, students at all levels of actual GPA could conceivably exaggerate
by the same magnitude. In addition, this procedure magniﬁes the exaggeration scores
of students with high actual GPAs, because a smaller raw change would be associated
with a larger proportion score at higher GPA levels. Thus, the proportion index pro-
vides an extremely conservative test of our hypothesis. Nevertheless, lower actual
GPAs continued to be associated with greater exaggeration using this alternative in-
dex (r ¼  :27, p <: 001). In addition, controlling for actual GPA, higher achievement
motivation continued to be associated with greater exaggeration (b ¼ :25, p <: 001).
Table 1
Correlations among all variables: Study 1 and Study 2
Measure 1 2345
1. Achievement motive — .12 .22  .08 .19 
2. Actual GPA .22   — .78    ).64    .50   
3. Self-reported GPA .36    .83    — ).02 .50   
4. Exaggeration .17  ).50    .06 — ).19 
5. Final course grade .20   .69    .65    ).23   —
Note. Values below the diagonal represent correlations for Study 1 (N ¼ 172). Values above the
diagonal represent correlations for Study 2 (N ¼ 104).
*p <: 05.
**p <: 01.
***p <: 001.
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consequences of exaggerated self-reports of GPA. All values represent standardized regression coeﬃcients.
In all three models, the paths from Achievement Motivation and Actual GPA to Exaggeration were de-
rived from a multiple regression analysis predicting Exaggeration. In Model 1, the path from Exaggeration
to Final Grade was derived from a simple regression analysis. In Model 2, the path from Exaggeration to
Final Grade was derived from a multiple regression analysis including Achievement Motivation as a sec-
ond predictor. In Model 3, the path from Exaggeration to Final Grade was derived from a multiple regres-
sion analysis including Actual GPA as a second predictor.   p <: 05;    p <: 01;     p <: 001.
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In light of the complex relations we observed among the variables in Study 1, we
elected to conduct a replication.
8. Method
8.1. Participants
A total of 111 university students (43 male and 68 female) from an undergraduate
psychology course participated in exchange for extra credit. The study was con-
ducted in multiple sessions over the course of a semester. Seven students with actual
GPAs of 4.0 were dropped from all analyses, because over-reporting was not possi-
ble in these cases.
8.2. Procedure
We used the same procedures as in Study 1 to obtain self-reported and actual
GPA, achievement motivation (K-R 20¼.69), and ﬁnal course grade.
9. Results
9.1. Exaggeration in self-reports of GPA
On average, participants over-reported their GPAs by just under 1/10th of a point
(M ¼ :079, SD ¼ :383). As in Study 1, this was a signiﬁcant discrepancy,
tð103Þ¼2:10, p <: 05. Again, the degree of over-reporting varied widely
(min ¼  0:67; max ¼ 1:78). Twenty percent of students over-reported their GPAs
by at least 1/4 point, 8% by at least 1/2 point, and 4% by a full point or more.
9.2. Predicting exaggeration
We next examined whether levels of actual performance and achievement mo-
tivation predicted the magnitude of exaggeration. Unlike Study 1, achievement
motivation and actual GPA were not signiﬁcantly correlated with one another.
In addition, although actual GPA was associated negatively with exaggeration,
the correlation between achievement motivation and exaggeration was not signif-
icant.
When we entered achievement motivation and actual GPA simultaneously into a
regression model, however, each predictor had a signiﬁcant unique association with
exaggeration. Higher achievement motivation was related to higher exaggeration
(b ¼ :16, p <: 05), whereas lower actual GPA was related to higher exaggeration
(b ¼  :66, p <: 001).
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Consistent with Study 1, there was a signiﬁcant negative correlation between the
exaggeration diﬀerence score and ﬁnal course grade (Table 1). The pattern of asso-
ciations, thus far, is represented in Fig. 2 (Model 1).
Also consistent with Study 1, achievement motivation and actual GPA were
each correlated positively with the ﬁnal grade in the course. Therefore, we re-
peated the regression analyses from Study 1 examining the relation between ex-
aggeration and ﬁnal grade, ﬁrst controlling for the eﬀects of achievement
motivation, and then controlling for the eﬀects of actual GPA. Replicating the
Study 1 ﬁndings, the relation between the exaggeration diﬀerence score and ﬁnal
grade remained negative after controlling for the eﬀects of achievement motiva-
tion (Fig. 2: Model 2). In Model 3, we controlled for the eﬀects of actual
GPA on ﬁnal grade. As shown in Fig. 2 (Model 3), the relation between exag-
geration (now a residualized score) and ﬁnal grade became positive and signiﬁ-
cant.
9.4. An alternative index of exaggeration: proportion
We also computed the alternative, proportion index of exaggeration. Using this
index, lower actual GPA continued to be associated with greater exaggeration
(r ¼  :38, p <: 001). Likewise, controlling for actual GPA, higher achievement mo-
tivation continued to be associated with greater exaggeration using the proportion
index (b ¼ :18, p <: 05).
10. Discussion
Results from both samples support our three primary hypotheses. First, students
exaggerated their academic performance. Second, an enhancement/approach moti-
vation (need for achievement) and a protection/avoidance motivation (poor prior
performance) independently predicted exaggerated self-reports. And, third, exagger-
ation grounded in poor prior performance predicted poor subsequent performance,
while exaggeration grounded in need for achievement predicted improved perfor-
mance.
Beyond these three speciﬁc predictions, we sought to clarify several issues re-
lated to the broader controversy, or ambiguity, about whether biases in self-eval-
uation are adaptive. Consistent with past theorists (Robins & John, 1997), we
argued that researchers should consider carefully the criteria that they use to assess
self-evaluation bias. The index researchers choose to represent the magnitude of
bias is of additional importance (e.g., diﬀerence score or residual). Finally, we ar-
gued that the same level of bias may reﬂect diﬀerent motivational factors, and that
these distinct motivations determine whether exaggerated self-reports are coordi-
nated with positive or negative outcomes. We explore these issues in greater detail
below.
R.H. Gramzow et al. / Journal of Research in Personality 37 (2003) 41–61 53Fig. 2. Study 2: Summary of regression analyses examining motivational antecedents and performance
consequences of exaggerated self-reports of GPA. All values represent standardized regression coeﬃcients.
In all three models, the paths from Achievement Motivation and Actual GPA to Exaggeration were de-
rived from a multiple regression analysis predicting Exaggeration. In Model 1, the path from Exaggeration
to Final Grade was derived from a simple regression analysis. In Model 2, the path from Exaggeration to
Final Grade was derived from a multiple regression analysis including Achievement Motivation as a sec-
ond predictor. In Model 3, the path from Exaggeration to Final Grade was derived from a multiple regres-
sion analysis including Actual GPA as a second predictor.   p <: 05;    p <: 01;     p <: 001.
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We selected an operational criterion (GPA) for assessing bias in self-reports. Be-
cause GPA is objective, speciﬁc, and veriﬁable, it provided several beneﬁts. First, it
allowed us to distinguish those students who exaggerated their self-reported GPA
scores from those who accurately reported high GPAs. This overcame the accu-
racy/exaggeration problem inherent in the normative model approach. Second, it al-
lowed us to be more certain that all students deﬁned the attribute similarly when
providing their self-reports, and that this deﬁnition matched the external criterion
by which we assessed self-evaluation bias. This overcame the asymmetric-deﬁnition
problem inherent in the social consensus approach.
We would like to emphasize, however, that meaningful operational criteria
may not exist for all attributes of psychological relevance, and, thus, may not
be appropriate for all research contexts. For example, we are not aware of objec-
tive tests for physical attractiveness or sense of humor. In addition, operational
criteria tend to be narrowly deﬁned. Researchers interested in broader constructs,
such as personality dimensions, are likely to ﬁnd operational criteria ill suited for
their needs. A primary purpose of the present research was to demonstrate that
people exaggerate their self-attributes even in comparison to objective and veriﬁ-
able criteria; we are not suggesting that such criteria are the only meaningful
comparison.
10.2. Self-evaluation bias is multiply motivated
The second purpose of this article was to examine motivational factors underlying
the tendency to exaggerate academic performance. We argued that self-evaluation
bias results from multiple factors—that persons exaggerate their self-reports for var-
ious reasons.
Self-protection. The ﬁrst reason for exaggerating was the desire to cover up poor
actual performance. We predicted that students with low actual grades would exag-
gerate their GPAs to a greater degree than students with high grades. Results from
both samples supported the predicted negative relation between actual GPA and ex-
aggeration. We argued that exaggerated self-reports are self-protective in this case,
enabling exaggerators to avoid the negative implications associated with acknowl-
edging poor performance. Previous research demonstrates that denying negative in-
formation about the self can have short-term psychological beneﬁts (see Suls &
Fletcher, 1985, for a review). We consider the negative association between actual
performance and exaggeration to reﬂect this process.
As noted previously, we used a diﬀerence score to measure exaggeration, and ac-
tual GPA (our measure of protection motivation) was a component of this diﬀerence
score. This may seem problematic because diﬀerence scores often are correlated with
their components (Campbell & Kenny, 1999; Cronbach & Furby, 1970). Although
such relations are common, however, they are not predetermined (Rogosa & Willett,
1983). In the present article, actual GPA was signiﬁcantly correlated with the self-ex-
aggeration diﬀerence score (Study 1: r ¼  :50, p <: 001; Study 2: r ¼  :64,
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was not (Study 1: r ¼ :06, p ¼ :436; Study 2: r ¼  :02, p ¼ :845).
Nevertheless, we noted in the Results section of Study 1 that the observed relation
between actual GPA and the exaggeration diﬀerence score could be a statistical ar-
tifact. To address this possibility, we computed an alternative proportion index. This
index represented the degree to which a given student exaggerated his or her GPA as
a proportion of the diﬀerence between his or her actual GPA and the maximum GPA
of 4.0. For this index, participants at all levels of actual GPA were equated in terms
of the magnitude by which they could exaggerate. In both samples, the negative cor-
relation between actual GPA and exaggeration remained signiﬁcant using this alter-
native index. The robustness of this correlation across the two indexes of
exaggeration suggests that the negative association between actual GPA and exag-
geration cannot be attributed entirely either to a ceiling eﬀect or to regression toward
the mean.
Kruger and Dunning (1999) reported a similar relation between actual and
self-reported performance. For example, participants in one of their studies took
a logical reasoning test that could be scored objectively. Those participants who
performed poorly on the test over-estimated their scores, whereas those who per-
formed well estimated accurately (i.e., there was a negative correlation between
actual performance and over-estimation). Kruger and Dunning attributed this
pattern to two deﬁcits among poor performers. First, poor performers were in-
competent on the test itself. Second, they lacked the meta-cognitive skills to rec-
ognize their incompetence (see Krueger & Mueller, 2002, for an alternative
interpretation).
Kruger and Dunnings (1999) ﬁndings suggest that students with poor actual
GPAs in our research may have over-reported their grades because of an inability
to recognize their poor academic performance. A key diﬀerence between the two par-
adigms, however, is that participants in Kruger and Dunnings research received no
objective feedback about their actual performance. The participants, therefore, esti-
mated how well they did in an ambiguous context. By contrast, university students
receive regular reports of their grades and overall GPA. In addition, although low-
GPA students might be less aware of their actual grades than high-GPA students, it
seems informative about their self-evaluative motivations that their self-reports are
systematically inﬂated, rather than simply inaccurate. In eﬀect, we believe that these
students are avoiding the reality of their poor academic standing, and are over-re-
porting that standing as a way to protect themselves from its negative implications.
We do not believe that they lack the capacity to read their transcripts.
Self-enhancement. The second motivation on which we focused was need for
achievement. We predicted that students with high need for achievement would
over-report their GPAs to a greater degree than students with low need for achieve-
ment. Results from both samples supported the predicted positive relation between
need for achievement and exaggeration. This pattern was consistent with the argu-
ment that motivation to excel in a given domain (i.e., an enhancement/approach ori-
entation) can contribute to egoistic bias in self-reports, even with respect to an
objective criterion such as GPA. In addition, our results indicated that the associa-
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from the association between actual performance and exaggeration.
Likewise, when controlling for actual GPA, achievement motivation continued to
be a signiﬁcant predictor of exaggeration using the alternative proportion index of
exaggeration. Thus, the positive relation between achievement motivation and exag-
gerated self-reports of GPA is not restricted to a speciﬁc operationalization of the
exaggeration construct.
10.3. Diﬀerent motivations have diﬀerent implications
The third purpose of this article was to examine whether the motivations under-
lying self-exaggeration qualify relations between exaggeration and other variables.
We argued that exaggerated self-reports can have positive or negative consequences,
depending on their impetus.
Overall, exaggerated self-reports were associated with poor subsequent perfor-
mance (Model 1). Students who exaggerated their GPAs at the beginning of the se-
mester received lower ﬁnal marks in the psychology course than students who
reported their GPAs more accurately. Recall that exaggeration was represented by
a diﬀerence score at this stage of the analysis.
We predicted that the relation between exaggeration and subsequent performance
would diﬀer based on the motivational factor underlying the exaggerated self-report.
Speciﬁcally, to the degree that exaggerated self-reports reﬂected poor actual perfor-
mance (protection/avoidance), we predicted that exaggeration would be coordinated
with poor performance in the future. However, once actual performance was statis-
tically controlled, and exaggeration reﬂected a strong achievement motivation (en-
hancement/approach), we predicted that exaggeration would be associated with
improved future performance. Therefore, in subsequent analyses, we examined the
association between exaggeration and subsequent performance, alternatively con-
trolling for each of the two motivational factors.
When we controlled for achievement motivation, exaggeration reﬂected its asso-
ciation with low GPA (Model 2). In both studies, achievement-motivation-free exag-
geration continued to predict poorer ﬁnal grades in the course. Importantly,
exaggeration retained its status as a diﬀerence score in this model.
The next model (Model 3) conﬁrmed that the negative relation between exagger-
ation and subsequent performance reﬂected the strong associations between these
two variables and actual GPA. Once the eﬀects of actual GPA were controlled, ex-
aggerated self-reports were associated with improved performance. Controlling for
actual GPA in this analysis has two implications for interpreting these results. First,
it means that exaggeration should be interpreted as a self-criterion residual score,
rather than a diﬀerence score (see Footnote 1). Second, it means that subsequent per-
formance should be interpreted as a performance residual. This is because the vari-
ance based on previous performance (actual GPA) was removed from the measure of
subsequent performance (ﬁnal grade). Thus, these ﬁndings suggest that the exagger-
ation residual score predicted higher grades than would be predicted by past perfor-
mance alone. This positive association between exaggeration and ﬁnal grade
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mance beneﬁts associated with self-exaggeration when it is motivated by an enhance-
ment/approach orientation (such as achievement motivation).
10.4. Some ﬁnal thoughts on the use of diﬀerence scores versus residuals
The relation between exaggeration and ﬁnal course grade initially suggested that
self-evaluation bias corresponded with poor subsequent performance (Models 1 and
2). With actual GPA held constant, however, greater exaggeration was associated
with higher ﬁnal grades (Model 3). This reversal underscores the complex nature
of the association between self-evaluation bias and subsequent performance, and
has several statistical and conceptual implications.
Statistically, this reversal indicates that actual GPA served as a suppressor vari-
able in the relation between the exaggeration diﬀerence score and ﬁnal course grade
(Tzelgov & Henik, 1991). Actual GPA was related strongly both to exaggeration
(negatively) and to ﬁnal grade (positively). These relations masked a positive relation
between exaggeration and subsequent performance, which was revealed only after
the eﬀects of GPA were controlled. Thus, the initial negative association between ex-
aggeration and subsequent performance reﬂected the common link between these
two variables and actual GPA. Once the eﬀects of actual GPA were controlled, how-
ever, exaggeration reﬂected its association with high achievement motivation, and
was coordinated with improved academic performance (relative to initial actual
GPA).
Conceptually, this reversal underscores the importance of distinguishing between
the use of diﬀerence scores and residuals as indexes of self-evaluation bias. Simply
put, the suppression pattern described above indicates that the exaggeration diﬀer-
ence score predicted poor subsequent performance, whereas the exaggeration resid-
ual score predicted improved performance. The shifting relation between
exaggeration and subsequent performance implies that exaggeration based on a dif-
ference score reﬂects a distinct theoretical construct from exaggeration based on a
residual procedure. We believe that adopting both strategies has allowed us to pro-
vide a more complete account of the antecedents and consequences of self-evaluation
bias. If we had focused solely on a residualized score, we would have been unable to
include actual GPA as a predictor in our regression models. By omitting actual
GPA, we would have concluded only that self-exaggeration is associated with strong
achievement motivation and improved performance. This conclusion would have
overlooked the fact that exaggeration can also reﬂect a desire to cover ones poor ac-
tual performance and, thus, can predict poor future performance. In eﬀect, the read-
er would be left with half the story.
10.5. Future directions
Our ﬁndings highlight an important distinction between self-protection/avoidance
and self-enhancement/approach as motivational antecedents to self-evaluation bias.
The focus on poor actual GPA as a protection/avoidance motivation, however, was
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be warranted, such as fear of negative evaluation (Watson & Friend, 1969) or self-
deceptive denial (Paulhus & Reid, 1991).
The protection/enhancement distinction raises several additional questions that
should be addressed in future research. First, we argued that persons exaggerate their
self-reports in the service of immediate aﬀective beneﬁts. Theoretically, these aﬀec-
tive beneﬁts should be coordinated with the motivation underlying the biased self-re-
port. Exaggeration in response to poor performance (protection/avoidance) should
protect against negative aﬀect, whereas exaggeration in response to high need for
achievement (enhancement/approach) should promote positive aﬀect. Therefore, fu-
ture research should directly assess aﬀective processes. Second, we found evidence
suggesting that exaggeration may have positive implications for performance when
it is prompted by an enhancement/approach motivation, rather than a protection/
avoidance motivation. Future research should address the possibility, however, that
this form of self-evaluation bias is maladaptive in other ways, such as for interper-
sonal relationships (Paulhus, 1998). Third, our ﬁndings were based on a correlational
design, and would be strengthened by experimental evidence. Finally, we assumed
that students were aware of their actual GPAs. It is possible, however, that students
who exaggerated believed that their self-reports were accurate. It may be important
to clarify whether students who exaggerate are aware of their inaccuracy, because
previous research suggests that bias in self-reports can result either from self-decep-
tion or from impression management concerns (Paulhus, 1984).
11. Summary and conclusion
In summary, we sought to address three questions related to the self-enhancement
controversy. First, what criteria should researchers use to establish reality? We ar-
gued that operational criteria (objective, speciﬁc, and veriﬁable attributes) have cer-
tain advantages over the criteria used more often in research on self-evaluation bias.
Second, why would persons exaggerate their self-reports? We argued that self-
evaluation bias is multiply motivated. Two persons exhibiting the same level of
self-exaggeration may do so for very diﬀerent reasons. In the present article, we iden-
tiﬁed a protection/avoidance motivation (the desire to cover ones poor past perfor-
mance) and an enhancement/approach motivation (the need for achievement) as
distinct antecedents to exaggerated self-reports of GPA.
Third, what costs and beneﬁts are associated with the tendency to exaggerate self-
reports? We determined that exaggerating ones GPA was associated with poor
subsequent academic performance, but that this was due to the strong association
between exaggeration and poor past performance. Once the eﬀect of past perfor-
mance was controlled, exaggeration was associated with positive subsequent perfor-
mance. In this case, exaggeration primarily reﬂected high need for achievement (an
enhancement/approach motivation). Thus, the relation between self-evaluation bias
and positive or negative outcomes appears to depend on the motivational factors
that underlie it.
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